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INTRODUCTION
The changing realm of terrorism has been considered
by terrorism analysts, politicians, as well as security experts
since the 1990s. Some prominent experts worth citing in-
clude Walter Laqueur, Bruce Hoffman, John Morgan, and
Ian Lesser. In his famous book The New Terrorism, Walter
Laqueur (1999) argued clearly that “there has been a radi-
cal transformation, if not revolution, in the character of
terrorism.” Hoffman (1998) explained further by provid-
ing a clue that new terrorism “represents a very different
and potentially greater lethal threat than the more famil-
iar ‘traditional terrorist groups.” In general, this idea re-
flects one particular conclusion that the pattern of terror-
ism in the 21st century has evolved. It bears new character-
istics. These can be seen in the motivation, tactics, as well
as capability of those involved including their technologi-
cal knowledge and organizational structure.
However, the presence of this claim is without prob-
lem. After examining the claims of new terrorism, Isabelle
Duyvesteyn (2004) for instance, concluded that it is “more
continuity than change can be argued to exist.” Magnus
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Abstrak
Pertanyaan mengenai apakah terorisme pada tiga dekade terakhir telah mengalami transformasi yang signifikan, merupakan salah satu isu
yang memicu perdebatan dalam studi kekerasan politik dewasa ini. Di satu sisi, beberapa ahli yang mendukung adanya pendapat tentang
terorisme baru mengatakan bahwa terorisme saat ini lebih berbasis agama, jauh lebih mematikan, mengalami perubahan besar dalam hal
struktur organisasi, dan tidak lagi bergantung pada dukungan negara. Di sisi lain, beberapa ahli menolak ide tentang terorisme baru dan
berpendapat bahwa yang ada selama ini hanyalah kontinuitas dalam aksi-aksi terorisme. Tulisan ini bertujuan mengklarifikasi perdebatan
tentang ‘terorisme baru’ dengan melihat sejarah terorisme. Melalui sebuah investigasi historis, tulisan ini menemukan bahwa konsep terorisme
baru secara tepat dapat menggambarkan karakter terorisme di masa ini. Namun demikian, dengan menelusuri beberapa peristiwa-peristiwa
terorisme, tulisan ini juga menemukan bahwa karakter-karakter tersebut tidaklah sepenuhnya baru. Banyak dari ciri-ciri yang diklaim sebagai
baru tersebut, ternyata memiliki banyak kesamaan dengan karakter terorisme di masa lalu.
Kata kunci: terorisme, terorisme baru, motif, negara, struktur organisasi.
Abstract
Whether or not the realm of terrorism has significantly transformed in the past three decades is one of major debates in the field of political
violence today. Proponents of new terrorism argue that current terrorists are more religious inspired and lethal, depend less on state’s
support and have changed their nature in term of organizational structure. On the other hand, some refuse the idea of new terrorism and,
instead, argue that there is only continuity regarding terrorist acts. This paper attempts to clarify the debates through a historical investiga-
tion within the history of terrorism and it reveals that characteristics brought by the concept of new terrorism are valid to describe the current
status of terrorism. However, by looking at some evidences in terrorism history, this paper also found out that those features are less unique
to terrorism operatives nowadays due to the fact that perpetrators’ activities in the past have similar attributes.
Keywords: terrorism, new terrorism, motive, state, organizational structure.
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Ranstrop (2007) noted that whether or not recent terror-
ism, is dramatically new or it is just the evolution of past
terrorism is one of major debates in terrorism research
today. This paper aims to analyze the proposition of new
terrorism. It attempts to clarify the debate by looking at
the history of terrorism. In particular, it will use some events
in the history of terrorism to test the validity of new terror-
ism. To do so, the paper will be divided into four parts.
First, it will briefly explore what are understood as terror-
ism and ‘new terrorism’. Secondly, it will elaborate some
historical events that are commonly used behind the argu-
ment of new terrorism. Thirdly, it will check the validity
of what is claimed to be new terrorism by looking at some
historical events in the previous era. The fourth section
will be the summary as well as the tentative conclusion.
ANALYSES
TERRORISM AND NEW TERRORISM
It has been acknowledged that efforts to define what is
known as terrorism will just find nothing but confusion.
Nonetheless, this is an important stage to build platform
for the word of terrorism to be clear and understandable,
particularly in its characteristics. At least there are 212 defi-
nitions of terrorism offered which was in use worldwide,
ninety of them used by governments and the other by in-
stitutions (Simon, 1994: 29). Even though it seems too
many, terrorism generally has some characteristics. First,
terrorism is rational acts that employ violence or the threat
of violence. It intends to achieve particular political pur-
pose and secular motivation. This for instance, can be
looked at Paul Wilkinson’s definition (2002: 12) as he as-
serted “terrorism is systematic use of coercive intimida-
tion, usually to service political ends.” For the last cen-
tury, terrorism acts commonly have been motivated by
Marxism, separatism, ethno nationalism, and limitedly
religion (Rapoport, 2003).
Moreover, as it is rational act, terrorists are still propor-
tional in terms of their actions. Jenkins (1987) noted that
“terrorist blow up things, kill people, or seize hostages.
Every terrorist incident is merely a variation on these three
activities.” However, many of their actions usually use hand-
ful tactics. Terrorist groups rarely use violence that inflicts
large number of casualties since it can delegitimize their
effort, limiting their ability to get funding or supporters.
They usually attack symbolic target including buildings,
persons or vehicles such as train or airplane. What they
want for their action is attention from the public in rela-
tion to their message as well as increased support for them.
Walter Laqueur (2003) asserted that “it was, more often
than not, ‘propaganda by deed’.” It is not so different com-
pared to the conclusion of Leonard Weinberg, Ami
Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoeffler (2004) after they ex-
amined seventy-three definitions of terrorism. They assert
that “terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving
the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit
of publicity plays a significant role.”
Even if they request something in return, in many cases
it is likely to be negotiable. Terrorist groups frequently
demand some barters for their action such as releasing
their comrade, ransom for the release of hostage, or even a
territory in case of ethno nationalist terrorism for instance.
But still their demand is stated clearly to the public, and
even sometimes it is difficult to be fulfilled, it still has pos-
sibility for the process of negotiation. In general, terror-
ism is a tactic that is “targeted and proportionate in scope
and intensity to the practical political objective being pur-
sued” (Simon & Benjamin, 2000: 65).
Second, nation-states were perceived widely as primary
actors behind acts of terrorism. It was part of the applied
strategy in the rivalry between superpowers during the cold
war (Enders & Sandlers, 1999). Both, either the US or the
USSR, used terrorism because it constituted less danger
than war but effective to cause damage and problem to
the other.
Third, terrorist groups have their structure of command
relatively clear. They may have small members consist of
20-30 persons to hundreds of people (Hofmann, 1998).
Though it is difficult to make a generalization how the
command and control structure in many terrorist groups,
Zawodny (1981) argued that it seems many contemporary
terrorist groups have centrifugal structure. It is where a
leader at the centre and the rest will be around like a solar
system.
New terrorism occurs, however, with some distinctions
that make some of characteristic above outmoded. Ian
Lesser (1999) believes that this new wave of terrorism “ren-
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ders much previous analysis of terrorism based on estab-
lished groups obsolete.” First, regarding its aim, terrorist
groups are no longer taking secular ideology for their mo-
tivation and inspiration but religion. Hoffman (1998)
noted that it is the main characteristics of contemporary
terrorism and they have “radically different values system,
mechanism of legitimatization and justification, concepts
of morality, and world view....”
The shifting of motivation as well as value system then
affects the nature of proportionality in their action. What
constrained in secular terrorist actions would be largely
difficult to be applied in religious terrorist. While in secu-
lar terrorism indiscriminate violence is unacceptable, it
will be different to religious terrorism. Cronin (2003)
pointed out that since their struggle is full with abstract
values, such as good against bad or God against devil, they
tend to dehumanize any person outside of their group and
perceive them as infidels. The result is that they may see
indiscriminate violence toward those infidels is morally
justifiable and necessary for the purpose of their struggle.
As it has been recognized, “for the religious terrorist, vio-
lence is divine duty…executed in direct response to some
theological demand…and justified by scripture” (Hofmann,
1988).
With intention to do destruction with massive casual-
ties, there is consideration that another feature of new ter-
rorism is terrorist groups will have the possibility to use
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in their acts. In the
past, as Laqueur (1996) explained, the using of WMD in
terrorism was in doubt because terrorists had less techni-
cal knowledge as well as expertise, it will increase public
anger instead of bringing benefits for their political aim
and it is not the nature of terrorism to cause large casual-
ties. However, today’s terrorists are different and all of those
conclusions are no longer valid to be attributed to them.
Hofmann (1998) stressed that many of the constraints (both
self-imposed and technical) which previously inhibited ter-
rorists’ use of WMD are eroding.
Terrorist potentiality to cause a large number of casual-
ties by using WMD then brings into question the factor of
politics in the character of terrorism. If politics can be
understood as the rational action to control each other
behavior in order to find equilibrium for their conflicting
interests (Lipson, 1984), there will be no clear political
objective for contemporary terrorism since they are likely
to be reluctant to talk on what they want to achieve and
insist in eliminating what they see as the enemy. To do
bargaining will be impossible as well as negotiating. In-
deed, Mathew J. Morgan (2004) wrote, that it seems,
“today’s terrorist don’t want a seat at the table, they want
to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it.” As a result,
it is rare for new terrorists to claim their attacks or to pub-
lish messages getting attention from the public regarding
their demand. Reflecting those characters above, Walter
Laqueur (1999) argued briefly that “the new terrorism is
different in character, aiming not at clearly defined politi-
cal demands but at the destruction of society and the elimi-
nation of large sections of the population.”
Secondly, new terrorists are becoming less dependent
on state assistance, especially for reasons of financing and
protection (Tucker, 2001). Unlike their predecessor, they
do not receive training or logistical help from a state. Their
innovation on tactics and capabilities are relied heavily on
their network followers who can provide their own logisti-
cal need as well as develop their ability by learning from
internet or other publications. In case of financial sup-
port, new terrorist groups commonly get their financial
sources ranging from illegal activities such drug traffick-
ing, internet, and credit card fraud, as well as donation
from legal businessmen or wealthy sympathizers (Raphaeli,
2003).
Finally, new terrorism exhibits the shifting of organiza-
tional system as they change and develop the system to be
more like business enterprise. New terrorists today have
no strict organization as well as structure and operates in
large cases by using the system of network. In the litera-
ture, a particular organization may be perceived as having
network system if its members can run their task without
having central authority or ‘commander’ rather than ‘net-
work core,’ which the latter has only the responsibility lim-
ited to “initiate criminal activities, arbitrate dispute and
provide direction” (William, 2001: 72).
Improvement on technological capabilities is likely to
be the main factor behind this shifting trend in terrorism
toward more ‘leaderless resistance’. With such revolution,
terrorists can share their experience, discuss various tac-
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tics among them and coordinate their action even a single
person who gives instruction. “Organs of information dis-
tribution such as newsletters, leaflets, computer etc., which
are widely available to all, keep each person informed of
events allowing for a planned response that will take on
many variations. No one need issue an order to anyone”
said American Far Right Leader, Louis Beam, in his expla-
nation about the concept of ‘leaderless resistance’ applied
(Beam, 1992). As a result, many amateur terrorist come
out today and it causes the increased willingness to inflict
large number casualties (Tucker, 2001).
NEW TERRORISM: SOME EVIDENCES
Though it is difficult to pinpoint what the cases would
be taken to inaugurate the new perspective on terrorism
trend, it seems that some experts have begun to believe
that terrorism now has entered a new phase after the events
of “the 1993 World Trade Center bombings in New York,
and related conspiracies; the 1996 Oklahoma city bomb-
ing; the 1998 East Africa bombings; and the Tokyo sarin
gas attack in 1995” (Simon & Benjamin, 2000). Al-Qaeda
attack in September 2001 is the important one which then
justifies the term, new terrorism. In general, it should be
noted that by the late 1990s, all of the new terrorism char-
acters were becoming obvious.
It has been considered that since the collapse of the
cold war, terrorist groups based on religious motivation
have risen. In many parts of the world, terrorists with secu-
lar ideological-based has decreased since 1980 while reli-
gion-based terrorism is on the increase (Gurr & Cole,
2000). From only two out of sixty-four terrorist religious
based at the international level in 1980, it rose to twenty-
five in 1995. Hoffman (1995) also looked further by show-
ing that while in the decades of 1960s there was no single
terrorist group which could be said to be motivated by
religion, the number rose to more than thirty per cent in
1990s.
It is widely admitted that the most dangerous threats
are coming from Islamist terrorist, but religion-driven ter-
rorist groups are present in other religions as well. As Mark
Juergensmeyer (2000) explained in his book, Terror in the
Mind of God, there are similar values in Islamic terrorists
with those in radical Christian and other religious funda-
mentalists. They identify themselves as the guardian of their
sacred values and their struggle is part of defending their
dignity. As a result, it is the effort without end and the
word of lost will have no meaning. Osama bin Laden’s
fatwa (1998) provides an example of this tendency when
he noted that it is the responsibility of muslim to fight
and to kill infidels wherever they are without giving clear
limitation of time (as cited in Morgan, 2004).
There are, indeed, some terrorist attacks across the re-
gions around the world from other religious terrorist groups
in the last decade. Sikh communities have produced ter-
rorists in order to create a religious state in Punjab (Zissis,
2008). Meanwhile, Aum Shinrikyo blew up nerve gas in
Tokyo subway in 1995 which 12 people were killed and
5000-6000 injured (Metraux, 1995). Few years before, Lord
Liberation Army (LRA) in Uganda abducted 25,000 chil-
dren since 1987 (Moller, 2006).
Christian fundamentalists have been suspected as well
to offer threat of terrorism. Not like its predecessor which
doing confrontation against government when state inter-
vene with political agenda, recent Christian terrorism has
willingness to do violence against government and doing
terror for a particular group in the society. Timothy
McVeigh detonated a bomb in Oklahoma and claimed it
is part of his destiny as a patriot and Christian (Duham,
1996). The Aryan Nations group in Idaho was also widely
reported of having aggressive action against the govern-
ment and conducting violence toward Jewish and colored
people (Kaplan, 2000). According to Jurgensmeyer (2004),
some similar evidences of the presence of Christian fun-
damentalists are found in the UK and Ireland as well.
At the same time, as US Department of State’s Pattern
of Global Terrorism in 2002 revealed, the lethality of in-
ternational terrorism increased dramatically since the end
1980s. The number of deaths and injured caused by ter-
rorist acts rose from 344 in 1991 to 6693 in 1998 (as cited
in Cronin, 2002). This figure worsened in 2009 as recorded
from 14,971 deaths around the world because of terrorist
attacks, 10,332 of them were brought by religious based
terrorists (NCC Report, 2009). It included those attacks
by al-Qaeda in Iraq, Sunni extremist in Somalia which
killed 88 people and wounded 245 as well as Caucasus
Emirate in Russia that 29 people killed in IED’s incident.
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All of them then validate the conclusion that today’s new
terrorism is more religious based and lethal.
Although they are more dangerous and lethal, evidences
also show many of these terrorists have no direct relation-
ships with a particular state to get financial backup as well
as logistical support. The Tamil Elam for example, has been
proven that they relied on wealthy sympathizer (Joshi, 1996)
as well as legal business in global market (Fair, 2005). Simi-
larly with al-Qaeda who is gathering its financial sources
through Islamic charities as well as global legal and illegal
business such as financial investment in banking system,
diamond trading and arms smuggling in Africa (Basile,
2004).
Bombing in the US embassy in Kenya and Tanzania,
moreover, revealed the trend that terrorists now operate
in less structured and cohesive membership (Hofmann,
1999). In Asia Pacific, terrorist groups such as Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) and al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah
used their diaspora or network to penetrate deeply and
launch terrorist attacks simultaneously in various areas
(Gunaratna, 2002).
HEALTHY CHECKS: NEW TERRORISM
Some experts argued that the concept of new terror-
ism has no strong validity as some of its characters could
be found in the history of its predecessor. This following
discussion will analyse the preposition of new terrorism
with regard to the aspects of goals, methods as well as orga-
nizational structures.
First, the supporters of new terrorism agreed that today’s
terrorism is motivated by religious values and goals rather
than secular ideology. Hofmann (1998) asserted that “the
religious imperative for terrorism is the most important
characteristic of terrorist activity today.” However, the phe-
nomenon of religious based terrorist groups is not new in
the history of terrorism. David Rapoport (1984) analysed
that religious terrorism has existed for many centuries, rang-
ing from the first century zealot to the 13th assassins up to
19th century.
If the analyses are going further, there is a problem
regarding the effort to differentiate religious terrorism with
the secular one in modern era. As Peter Neuman (2009)
noted, it is mistaken “the attempt to separate ‘religious’
from ‘political’ terrorism as if the two categories were
mutually exclusive.” In fact, religious words are functioned
just as rhetoric to justify the using of violence for their
political agenda. They who are claimed to be religious ter-
rorists by new terrorism supporters have perceived them-
selves as political actors, using terrorism to achieve their
political objectives. Hezbollah for instance, has two func-
tions as a political party as well as resistance organization.
It also happened in the case of Timmothy MacVeigh
which is still debatable whether it was terrorism inspired
by Christian Identity or just political agenda against fed-
eral disrupts at Ruby Ridge and Waco (Quillen, 2002).
With regard to the 9/11 attacks, it was a political terror-
ism rather than a religious one. Stephen Holmes (2005),
having observed the attacks, concluded that “what hit the
United States on 11 September was not religion, there-
fore. Instead, the 9/11 terrorist represented the pooled
insurgencies of the Arab Middle East.” He noted that since
al-Qaeda failed to overthrow by force the governments of
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, they changed the target to the
‘far enemy’ who claimed as the supporter of those two
countries.
The nexus of having religious motivation and inten-
tion to carry out more lethal attacks are complicated even
the data is seemingly showing these two variables con-
nected. Compared to the practice of terrorism in the past,
this new terrorism is argued to be more lethal and willing
to inflict mass casualties without selecting target. Is it a
correct argument? In 1880, the French anarchist bombed
restaurant frequently during the conflict with the working
class (Miller, 1995). In 1946, Zionist killed 91 and injured
45 by detonating bomb at the King David Hotel in Jerusa-
lem. The Japanese Red Army’s attack on the Tel Aviv air-
port killed 24 and wounded 80 in 1972 (Kuriyama, 1973).
Willingness to do wanton destruction also has been found
as well in the ring-wing terrorists’ history. The Bologna
railroad station bombing in 1980 killed 80 and injured
170 (Frykberg & Tepas, 1988), simultaneous truck bomb-
ing attack in Lebanon on the US and French in 1983 bar-
rack resulted 241 dead (Burk, 1999), Pan Am tragedy by
the secular regime of Colonel Qadafi left 270 dead, and
the downing of an Air India by Sikh terrorist took the life
of 329 (Pettiford & Harding, 2003).
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It is true that there is no evidence in history showing
that particular or more terrorist groups have taken lives in
one attack as large as al-Qaeda did on 9/11. Nevertheless,
the term of new terrorism has been widely used since the
beginning of 1990s, long before the tragedy. Examples at
the literatures on new terrorism, in fact, have used events
that showed no new characteristics for the terrorists’ goals
and the nature of lethality. Even if al-Qaeda’s 9/11 has
been taken as a case to justify the concept, or the begin-
ning of new terrorism wave, further problem occurs re-
garding the validity of the concept. Is it valid to make a
generalization about characteristics of terrorism based on
one particular case? Academically it will be hard to agree.
Terrorists today are still concerned with how media
publish their acts. Moreover, even though they believe that
their violence is justified by God, public opinions consis-
tently have significant effects to their agenda (Tucker, 2001).
Attacks by al-Jamaah al-Islamiya in Egypt for instance, pro-
vides an example of how public support can decrease
dramatically if they perceive a terrorist action to be unac-
ceptable. That attacks killed 62 people and massive report
from mass media made the public reluctant to support
that organization (Takeyh, 2001).
The issue of WMD in new terrorism is complicated.
As Silke observed (2007), “in the list of the 200 most de-
structive terrorist attacks in the past twenty years, not a
single one involved WMDs.” Indeed, many researches in
terrorism have reported mass casualties caused by terrorist
attacks using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
weapons (CBRN) rather than WMD. In fact, some terror-
ist groups not only have planned to launch either chemi-
cal or biological attacks, but also done it since many years
ago. The ‘Order of the Rising Sun,’ which had a plan to
poison water supply in Chicago, were found and arrested
in possession of 30-40 kilograms typhoid bacteria
(Kornfeld, 2003: 446). In 1984, two members of Oregon
based cult headed by Bhagwan Shree Rajness contaminated
salad bars with Salmonella and poisoned 750 people (Mar-
tin, 2000). In Europe, the threat of chemical terrorism has
been recorded with the finding that Germany’s Red Fac-
tion Army had tried to produce in early 1980s botulinum
toxin to make nerve gas (Falkenrath, 1998). PKK contami-
nated Turkish air force water tanks in Istanbul by using
cyanides in a lethal dosage in 1992 and the Tamil Tigers
used chlorine gas to attack Sri Lankan military base camp
in 1990 (Cameron, 2004).
Concerning the use of nuclear weapons in terrorist at-
tacks, there are no evidences that terrorist has used nuclear
or radiological weapon to make serious destruction despite
official put attention seriously on the possibility. Accord-
ing to David Claridge, government often exaggerates the
issue and wastes many resources (Claridge, 1999). Even
Jogman (2008) predicted that in the future, the use of
“chemical and biological weapons are seen as more likely
than radiological and nuclear weapons.” However, one
should note that although it is not to say they have planned
to explode nuclear bombs, terrorists have attacked some
nuclear power stations in the 1980s. The ETA attacked
simultaneously two nuclear reactors in Lemoniz during
1980-1981 and two separate bombings by Super Movements
Anti-Nuclear caused serious damage at the nuclear plant
at Golfech, France, in 1980 (Bass & Jenkins, 1983). Also
the ANC sabotaged two South African nuclear sites in
1980 although both of them were in operation at that time
(Laqueur, 1999).
Second, new terrorism agreed that dominantly new
terrorists do not need state sponsorship. However, state,
as some experts argue, consistently has role in supporting
terrorism. One example is Iran’s role in giving financial
help for training camps in Sudan and both Iran’s and
Syria’s support for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Morgan,
2004). Even in the case of al-Qaeda, others also believe
that Afghanistan still has important part it plays in its ac-
tivities as it provides bases, training camps, and a safe place
for al-Qaeda’s members (Strohl, 2003). Perhaps what needs
to be clear at first in this argument is what state sponsor-
ship means. New terrorism experts argued that terrorists
today depend less on states to support their financial needs.
But Thomas Copeland (2001: 98) explained that although
terrorist groups rely on crime organizations and individual
donations for their financial support, both actors com-
monly are in symbiotic relationships with states because
they operate in state or global financial system. He argued
that it is “merely a variation on state sponsorships.”
Third, Paul Wilkinson (1986) noted “terrorism is in-
herently international in character.” It means international
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terrorism is not a new phenomenon in these decades as
new terrorism claimed. Therefore, terrorist groups always
have networks and cooperate if they have similar agenda.
In 1971, the Irish navy revealed that al-Fatah helped Provi-
sional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in providing arms
after seizing a ship carrying arms and ammunitions
(Wilkinson, 1986). Moreover, some cases have proved that
terrorist groups have the ability to operate outside of their
origin from three decades ago. The Japan Red Army (JRA)
hijacked Japan Airlines in 1973 together with Palestinians.
Also in 1974, People Front for the Liberation of Palestina
(PFLP) worked together with JRA to explode Shell oil rig
in Singapore (Kushner, 2003).
Loosely structure does not exclusively belong to the
current terrorist groups. In the previous century, anarchist
terrorists who operated in Russia and France empire and
actively attacked against heads of state was a network in-
stead of hierarchically based (Hofmann, 2001). Even in
the twentieth century, some terrorist organizations used
network-based structure. The Palestinian Liberation Orga-
nization (PLO) is like an umbrella as it consists of differ-
ent factions (Cobban, 1981). In Hezbollah, its members
are less cohesive, unpredictable as well as not in strict com-
mand and control structure (Ranstorp, 1994).
CONCLUSION
Although it is hard to pinpoint what even can be taken
to support their arguments, some observers claim that the
presence of ‘new terrorism’ became obvious with al-Qaeda
attack of 9/11. Observation at three characteristics attrib-
uted to new terrorism, those are goals, terrorist-state rela-
tionships as well as organizational structure, reveals that
these assessments are valid to describe current terrorism.
However, by looking at some evidences in the history of
terrorism, one discovers that those features are not really
new since many of them have similarities rather than dif-
ferences with the characteristics of terrorism in the previ-
ous era. Indeed, terrorism today has changed, particularly
in terms of technology as well as tactics. But terrorism has
always changed time by time in order to do adjustment
with improvement of the circumstance where they oper-
ate. To sum up, only few are new with the claim of new
terrorism.
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